We consider an incumbent who operates in two independent markets and has private information about his production cost. In one of the markets, there is a potential entrant o¤ering a di¤erentiated product. The most reasonable perfect bayesian equilibrium is either the least cost separating equilibrium or the pooling equilibrium where both types of incumbents set the low cost monopoly prices. The equilibrium may involve a downward distortion in both markets pre-entry prices. This distortion is increasing with the discount factor, the degree of product substitutability and the e¢ ciency of the entrant. An implication of our model for international trade policy is that a lower price in the foreign market is neither a necessary nor a su¢ cient condition for the existence of entry deterrence in the foreign market.
Introduction
Predation involves a dominant …rm that sets low prices and thus sacri…ces short-run pro…t in order to drive a rival out of the market or deter entry, thus achieving higher pro…t in the long-run -see Joskow and Klevoric (1979) , Niels (1993) , Tirole (1988) and Motta (2004) . Thus one can either have models of predation where the incumbent …rm forces exit or models where entry is discouraged.
Following McGee (1958) assessment of the rationality of predation, several models have been developed providing a convincing context where predation is a rational strategy. Most of these predation models are based on incomplete information. 1 This is the case of signaling models, reputation models and long purse predation models. Predation signaling models'type of reasoning was …rst developed by Milgrom and Roberts (1982) . In this model, a potential entrant has imperfect knowledge about the incumbent's production cost and the incumbent exploits this uncertainty in order to make the entrant believe that entry is unpro…table (limit pricing model).
Reputation models explore the incentive to prey if the incumbent sells in di¤erent markets (see Kreps and Wilson (1982) ) while long purse predation models consider frameworks where there are di¤erences between …rms' …nancial constraints and thus the incumbent can survive longer using its deep pockets (see Benoit (1984) ).
The Milgrom and Roberts (1982) model considers an incumbent operating in a single market.
However, many …rms operate in several markets (v.g. domestic and foreign market). This fact raises several issues: if there is potential entry, how is entry deterrence a¤ected by the fact that the incumbent operates in several markets? If the incumbent distorts prices to deter entry will prices be distorted in all the markets or just in the market where entry might occur? This paper focus on a monopolistic limit pricing model 2 but uses a multimarket setup. Considering di¤erent independent geographical markets, the use of third-degree price discrimination is optimal and studying how entry is a¤ected when the incumbent sets discriminatory prices to deter entry is a relevant and interesting issue. 3 We develop a two-period framework where a multimarket incumbent faces a single potential entrant in one of the two markets where he operates. The incumbent has private information 1 Other contexts in which predation is feasible and rational are, for example, models with learning curves (Cabral and Riordan (1997) ) and models with increasing returns (Ordover and Saloner (1989) ).
2 Harrington (1987) and Bagwell and Ramey (1991) explore multiple incumbents' setups. For simultaneous olipolistic signaling see also Mailath (1989) . 3 Under a spatial market model, Aguirre et al. (1998) explore the strategic choice of pricing policies to deter entry when there is asymmetric information about incumbent …rm's transportation costs. They show that the incumbent …rm may use spatial price discrimination to deter entry. about his production cost, which may either be low or high. In the …rst period, the incumbent sets his optimal third-degree discriminatory prices. The entrant observes the prices in both markets and decides whether to enter or not after updating his beliefs on the likelihood of the incumbent's production cost being low. If entry occurs, …rms compete in prices. Naturally, the entrant will use the price information of every market where the incumbent operates in order to infer incumbent's production cost. Therefore, the incumbent may use both pre-entry prices as signals for his production cost.
Other authors have explored the use of multiple signals to deter entry. 4 Bagwell and Ramey (1988) extend Milgrom and Roberts (1982) incomplete cost information model by allowing …rms to use price and advertising as potential signals and show that, in a sequential equilibrium, low prices and high advertising are used. This paper is the closest to our analysis. Bagwell and Ramey (1990) explore a setup where the incumbent has private information concerning market demand and study sequential equilibria for di¤erent alternatives of what the incumbent prefers that the market be believed to have (high or low demand). When the incumbent prefers to be believed to operate in a low demand market, low prices and low advertising are used to signal low demand whereas when the incumbent prefers to be believed to operate in a high demand market, both high prices and advertising are used. In both cases, dissipative advertising is never used. Our paper di¤ers from this research as we consider a multimarket incumbent and explicitly assume that the entrant o¤ers a di¤erentiated product. We show that when the incumbent …rm sells in more than one market, he uses every pre-entry price to signal his production cost and deter entry. Thus, being a multimarket incumbent facilitates entry deterrence. We also show that the degree of product substitutability a¤ects the predatory signals.
As usual, we analyze the pure strategy perfect bayesian equilibria and …nd multiple equilibria.
However by imposing equilibrium re…nements we show that there always exists a unique reasonable perfect bayesian equilibrium, a result which was not derived in the previously mentioned articles. When the two types are very di¤erent the most reasonable result is the separating equilibrium where the low cost incumbent charges his monopoly prices. In this case, we get precisely the same solution than under complete information. When types are not very di¤er-ent, the most reasonable equilibrium depends on the prior beliefs. On the one hand, when the prior probability of the incumbent being low cost is small, the most reasonable equilibrium is the least cost separating equilibrium, where the low cost incumbent distorts the pre-entry prices just enough to signal that he is not a high cost incumbent. One the other hand, when there is a high probability of the incumbent being low cost, the most reasonable equilibrium is the one where both types pool at the low cost monopoly prices. Although the entry deterrence literature has emphasized the least cost separating equilibrium, our results show that there are circumstances where the pooling equilibrium is the most reasonable equilibrium. In addition, the pooling equilibrium is the most problematic one in terms of antitrust policy, which suggests that one should be aware of the circumstances where it is likely to occur.
When types are not very di¤erent, one of the types (the low cost type in the least cost separating equilibrium and the high cost type in the pooling equilibrium) distorts prices downwards with respect to the prices under complete information. Assuming linear demands, the distortion is equal in both markets and increasing with the discount factor, the degree of product substitutability and the e¢ ciency of the entrant.
Our setup has interesting implications for antitrust regulation and for international trade policy. Our results suggest that, when the incumbent operates in several markets and is able to use third-degree price discrimination, predatory tests based on a single market are inadequate.
In addition, it reveals di¤erences in the discriminatory pricing behavior when there are entry deterrence objectives from when there is pure third-degree price discrimination (within a complete information setting). The existence of entry deterrence objectives widens the di¤erences in relative prices across markets. In terms of international trade policy, traditionally, the suspicion of predatory behavior is only considered when the price practiced in the foreign market is lower than in the domestic market (dumping price). However our results show that we may have predatory pricing by the incumbent even when he is charging higher prices in the foreign market. Thus dumping price is not necessary for the existence of entry deterrence in the foreign market.
This paper is organized in four sections. In Section 2 we set up the model and our main assumptions. Perfect bayesian equilibria are analyzed in Section 3. In Section 4 we draw some policy implications of our model. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Model
Consider a two-period model where an incumbent …rm, I, operates in two distinct and independent geographical markets, A and B. The incumbent can use discriminatory pricing in these markets. 5 In the …rst period only this …rm is operating. The incumbent faces a potential entrant …rm, E, in market A only. The incumbent's constant marginal production cost, c, can be high, c, or low, c = 0, where c > c. To simplify notation we will drop the superscript I for the remainder of this paper. However, one should keep in mind that when a price, quantity, pro…t function or marginal production cost has no superscript they represent incumbent's variables. The incumbent's production cost is private information. The entrant holds a prior belief, assumed to be common knowledge, concerning the probability, o , that the incumbent has low production cost, with o 2 ]0; 1[. Knowing his production cost, the incumbent sets …rst period prices in both markets. After observing the incumbent's pre-entry price in each market, p A and p B , the entrant updates his beliefs concerning the probability that the incumbent has low production cost. We denote the posterior belief that the incumbent has low production cost by (p A ; p B ),
. Based upon this posterior belief, the entrant decides whether to enter in market A with a di¤erentiated product. Since the entry decision is taken after the incumbent has set his …rst period price in each market, these pre-entry prices can be used to signal the incumbent's production cost. Second period pro…ts are discounted by , with 2 ]0; 1].
If entry occurs, in the second period …rms compete in prices. We assume that the entrant learns the incumbent's cost before price decisions are taken. Thus, price competition in the second period occurs under complete information. The entrant also has constant marginal production cost, c E , where c E 0. Let f E denote the entrant's cost of entering market A,
where f E 0. 6 Both c E and f E are known by the incumbent. Both …rms have null …xed costs.
We assume linear demand in both markets. This type of demand function can be derived from the consumer's utility maximization problem. 7 Deriving demands from the consumer's 5 We assume there is no arbitrage. 6 We assume that …rm E's entry cost in market B is so high that entry in this market would always be unpro…table. 7 Following Dixit (1979), we assume the following representative consumer's utility function in the competitive market:
where q I A and q E are the quantities consumed of the incumbent's and entrant's product, respectively, and q o A is utility maximization problem guarantees consistency between a …rm's demand under monopoly and under duopoly and allows us to obtain a detailed characterization of the most reasonable equilibrium. With a single …rm operating in market i, demand is given by:
where a i and b i are positive constants and p i and q i are the price and quantity demanded in market i. In market A; when entry occurs, demand of …rm i is given by:
where q i A is the quantity demanded of …rm i's product and p i A and p Let p im and p im be the monopoly prices in market i when the incumbent has high and low production costs, respectively. Let im and im be the monopoly pro…ts. Let Ad ; E and Ad ; E be the post-entry equilibrium pro…ts of the incumbent and the entrant when the incumbent has high and low production costs, respectively, and costs are common knowledge (see details in Appendix A).
We assume the following relationships between market B and A's parameters:
Parameter k measures the di¤erence in market demands. Under no entry and assuming (2) and (3), when k ! 1 markets A and B are identical. When k < 1 demand in market A is larger than demand in market B and for a given market price, demand in market A is less elastic than the quantity of all other products (with price normalized to 1). This utility captures the desire for variety.
demand in market B. This implies that under third-degree price discrimination the monopoly price will be higher in market A, p Am > p Bm . The reverse holds for k > 1. When k > 1 the model captures a dumping behavior. Considering market B as the domestic market and market A as the foreign market, the incumbent sets a lower price in the foreign market under third-degree price discrimination. Our analysis focus on k < 1 (we also studied the cases of Ad ; E ; Ad and E are all non-negative. Therefore, we consider k < 1 and parameters'values
Although we have assumed linear demands, most our analysis is done at a general level and thus it can easily be applied to other demand speci…cations. However it should be noted that a precise characterization of the set of equilibria and of the most reasonable equilibria should always address the issue of consistency between a …rm demand under monopoly and under duopoly.
Perfect bayesian equilibria
In this section we analyze the pure strategy perfect bayesian equilibria of our signalling game.
A perfect bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is fully characterized if we set strategies for each …rm as a function of the information available at each decision point as well as beliefs for the entrant about the incumbent's production cost. The beliefs must be consistent with the information structure (using Bayes'rule) and with the hypothesis that the given strategies were being set.
Given beliefs, all strategies must be best response strategies.
In the next subsection we analyze separating equilibria and subsection 3.2 studies pooling equilibria. The equilibria' results are summarized in subsection 3.3 where, using equilibrium re…nements, we are able to show that there always exists a unique reasonable PBE.
Separating equilibria
We assume that E > f E > E . Thus, under complete information, the entrant would not enter if the incumbent has low production cost but he would enter if the incumbent has high production cost. Since monopoly pro…ts are never smaller than duopoly pro…ts, both types of incumbent would like to convince the entrant to be low cost. However, the entrant is aware of this and only believes the incumbent to be low cost if he sends a credible signal. Consequently the low cost incumbent may have to use costly signals to separate from his high production cost counterpart.
In a separating PBE, …rst period prices charged by the high and low cost incumbents di¤er, On the other hand (p A ; p B ) must be such that it is unpro…table for the high cost incumbent to mimic the low cost incumbent, i.e.:
Or equivalently:
The left hand side of condition (4) is the …rst period loss if the high cost incumbent deviates from his equilibrium strategy. The right hand side of condition (4) is the second period gain if the high cost incumbent deviates from his equilibrium strategy and mimics the low cost incumbent.
Let C be the set of (p A ; p B ) that satisfy the incentive compatibility condition (4) . Figure 1 shows the …rst period isopro…t curve of the high cost incumbent such that condition (4) holds in equality. Set C is the set of prices which are outside this isopro…t curve.
Moreover, for a separating PBE to exist, it must be true that (p A ; p B ) is optimal for the low cost incumbent, i.e.:
Let C be the set of (p A ; p B ) that satisfy the incentive compatibility condition (5). Set C is the set of points inside the …rst period isopro…t curve of the low cost incumbent represented in Figure 1 .
The following proposition sets a su¢ cient condition for the existence of a separating PBE. then the set C \ C is non-empty and consequently there exists a separating PBE.
Proof: To show necessity is enough to notice that if condition (4) or condition (5) fail, then either the high cost or the low cost incumbent is not behaving optimally in the proposed separating PBE for any speci…cation of the o¤-the-equilibrium beliefs. Thus one can not have a separating PBE. To show that conditions (4) and (5) are su¢ cient for a separating PBE to exist it is important to notice that in a separating PBE, by Bayes' rule, (p A ; p B ) = 1 and
Given these beliefs and the fact that E > f E > E , it is optimal for the entrant not to enter when he observes (p A ; p B ) and to enter otherwise. But then, given the entrant's strategy, it is optimal for the high cost incumbent to set (p Am ; p Bm ) and the low cost incumbent to set (p A ; p B ) if conditions (4) and (5) 
The existence of a separating PBE depends on whether C \ C is non-empty or not. Condition (6) means that it is more pro…table to generate favorable beliefs (which deter entry) for the low cost incumbent than to the high cost incumbent. Condition (6) is the typical single-crossing condition which guarantees existence of a separating PBE. The proof that condition (6) High cost isoprofit curve Low cost isoprofit curve Figure 1 : Set of (p A ; p B ) that can be sustained as separating equilibria in dark grey.
Most reasonable separating equilibrium
The lack of restrictions upon o¤-the-equilibrium path posterior beliefs generates multiple separating perfect bayesian equilibria. The literature on re…nements of perfect bayesian equilibria suggests plausibility criteria upon o¤-the-equilibrium path posterior beliefs. One of these cri-teria states that when the entrant observes an o¤-the-equilibrium path action, he should put probability zero on any type of incumbent for which the incumbent's action is dominated, i.e., the entrant should not believe that the incumbent sets a dominated strategy. If we impose the domination criterion, there emerges a unique separating PBE for each possible set of parameters' values c; c E ; k; .
The pre-entry prices (p A ; p B ) are considered to be dominated for an incumbent whose production cost is i, i standing for high or low, if:
Thus, pre-entry prices (p A ; p B ) are dominated for type i if this type of incumbent has less pro…t with these prices under the most favorable entry conditions (i.e., no entry) than with preentry monopoly prices in both markets under the least favorable entry conditions. If (p A ; p B ) is dominated for a high cost incumbent but not dominated for a low cost incumbent, the entrant should not believe that the incumbent has high production cost when he observes (p A ; p B ). Thus the only reasonable beliefs are (p A ; p B ) = 1.
The set of separating perfect bayesian equilibria, C \ C, contains pre-entry prices (p A ; p B ) which are dominated for a high cost incumbent (since they satisfy condition (4) in inequality) but are not dominated for a low cost incumbent (since they satisfy condition (5)). Therefore, the entrant's reasonable beliefs are given by (p A ; p B ) = 1 for all (p A ; p B ) 2 C \ C for which condition (4) is satis…ed in inequality or, equivalently, for all (p A ; p B ) 2 C \ C which are not in the frontier of C (we denote this set by (int C) \ C ). Given these beliefs, the entrant will not enter if he observes any (p A ; p B ) in (int C) \ C and he will also not enter if he observes the low cost incumbent's equilibrium prices (p A ; p B ). The next lemma characterizes the low cost incumbent equilibrium strategy under these beliefs.
Lemma 1
The low cost incumbent strategy in any separating PBE immune to the domination criterion is the solution (p A ; p B ) of the following problem:
subject to:
where the two constraints are the incentive compatibility conditions (4) and (5), respectively.
For a given combination of parameters' values c; c E ; k; there is a unique solution to this constrained optimization problem. Thus, there exists a unique separating PBE immune to the domination criterion.
Proof: If the solution of problem (7) is in (int C) \ C, it is immediate that only this solution can survive the domination criterion. Since the entrant does not enter for any (p A ; p B ) in (int C) \ C, a low cost incumbent gets monopoly pro…t in the second period for any (p A ; p B ) in
is not behaving optimally.
If the solution of problem (7) is in the frontier of C and we consider any (p A ; p B ) in (int C) \ C, the low cost incumbent would always have an incentive to deviate to a pair of
. Thus, none of the separating equilibria in (int C) \ C survives the domination criterion. Moreover, if we consider any
in the frontier of C but di¤erent from (p A ; p B ) the low cost incumbent would gain by deviating to a pair of prices in (int C) \ C arbitrarily close to (p A ; p B ).
The uniqueness result is a direct consequence of solving the constrained optimization problem
Henceforth, we will use the expression « least cost separating equilibrium» to denote the unique separating PBE immune to the domination criterion.
Graphically, the least cost separating equilibrium is the point in the grey area of Figure 1 where the low cost incumbent has higher …rst period pro…ts. There are two possible types of solution depending on whether (p Am ; p Bm ) belongs or does not belong to (int C) \ C. When the vector of low cost monopoly prices is dominated for the high cost incumbent, the high cost incumbent does not want to mimic the low cost one at prices (p Am ; p Bm ) even if by doing so he deters entry. But then the low cost incumbent does not need to distort prices to signal that he is low cost. This case happens when the two types of incumbent are very di¤erent. The other type of solution occurs when (p Am ; p Bm ) = 2 (int C) \ C, which is illustrated in Figure 2 . In this case, the least cost separating equilibrium is in the frontier and it is given by the point where the low cost isopro…t curve is tangent to the incentive compatibility condition (4). Thus the low cost incumbent distorts downwards the prices in both markets by an amount just enough for the high cost incumbent not wanting to imitate him. 
The next proposition characterizes the two types of least cost separating equilibria under our linear demand assumptions.
Proposition 2
The two types of least cost separating equilibria are as follows:
(i) When no constraint is binding:
(ii) When IC is the only binding constraint:
Proof: The result is a direct consequence of solving the low cost incumbent's optimization problem (7). Kuhn-Tucker conditions are described in Appendix D.
This result is illustrated in Figure 3 . For low discount factor, < b , in the least cost separating equilibrium the low cost incumbent charges his monopoly prices. For larger discount factors the least cost separating equilibrium involves a downward distortion in both pre-entry prices relatively to the complete information monopoly prices. At Sol 1 , the least cost separating equilibrium equals the complete information monopoly prices. When the discount factor is low, the future gain by mimicking the low cost incumbent is very small. Thus the high cost incumbent will only be willing to deviate by a small amount from his monopoly prices in order to deter entry. For low enough the high cost incumbent will not be willing to charge the low cost monopoly prices even if, by doing so, he is interpreted as being low cost and deters entry. Consequently the low cost incumbent does not need to distort prices in order to separate himself from his high cost counterpart. In this case, e¢ cient signalling is costless. This solution holds for ^ where^ is increasing with c. Notice that the larger is c, the larger is the di¤erence between the two types of incumbent's production cost, thus the larger is the di¤erence between their monopoly prices. As a consequence the larger is c, the larger is the interval of discount factors where Sol 1 holds.
As increases, the high cost incumbent incentive to imitate the low cost incumbent increases.
For >^ the high cost incumbent is willing to charge the low cost incumbent monopoly prices if that deters entry. But then, the low cost incumbent needs to distort prices downwards in order to separate himself. Sol 2 presents pre-entry prices lower than the complete information prices.
The downward distortion in prices is precisely the same in the two markets and it is given by:
Since p Am is higher than p Bm and the distortion in absolute terms is the same in the two markets, the relative price decrease is higher in market B and consequently the price in market B becomes smaller in relative terms. This implies that, if we look at relative prices, the existence of limit pricing tends to exacerbate the impact of third degree price discrimination: the price in the more elastic market becomes even lower in relative terms.
There are several factors which in ‡uence the downwards distortion. The downward distortion in prices is increasing with . As rises, the future becomes more important and the high cost incumbent has more incentive to mimic the low cost incumbent. But this implies that the low cost incumbent has to increase the distortion in prices in order to separate from his high cost counterpart. A similar reasoning applies when the e¢ ciency of the entrant increases. When c E decreases, i.e., when the entrant becomes more e¢ cient, Ad decreases and thus the high cost incumbent has more incentive to imitate the low cost one as he gains more by continuing to be a monopolist. Consequently, the downward distortion in prices is increasing with the level of e¢ ciency of the entrant.
Interestingly, the degree of product substitutability also a¤ects the level of the downward distortion in prices (through Ad ). When ! 0, i.e., products are completely di¤erentiated, then Am ! Ad . But then the incumbent has no incentive to deter entry as he would not gain anything by doing so. Conversely when ! 1, i.e., products are highly substitutable, then
Am is much higher than Ad and thus the downward distortion in prices is the highest possible.
Therefore, when the degree of product substitutability rises, the downward distortion in prices increases.
Since the distortion is increasing with , for very high the low cost incumbent may charge a price below marginal cost in market B (p B < c) This happens for > e , where
In this case, the low cost incumbent is loosing money in the captive market which may lead us to think that he would be better o¤ not serving this market. However, the incumbent is using 8 If we had assumed bB = b A w the distortion in Sol2 would be
. the captive market to signal his cost to the entrant and his signalling costs are lower this way than if abandoned market B (if he did that he would need to increase the downward distortion in market A, which would hurt him more, as market A is larger and less elastic). This scenario is only relevant when e < 1, which can only happen for parameters values in subset S 3 (see details in Appendix E).
A very important feature of the least cost separating equilibrium is that, when the low cost incumbent needs to use costly signalling to separate from his high cost counterpart, he prefers to lower prices in both markets rather than lowering the price just in the market with potential entry. This result holds in general. By contradiction, one can show that it cannot be optimal for the low cost incumbent to distort prices just in market A. If p A < p Am and p B = p Bm , the low cost incumbent would gain by increasing p A and decreasing p B in such a way that the high cost incumbent remains indi¤erent. By doing so the low cost incumbent has a …rst order gain in market A while his loss in market B is only a second order loss. Thus it cannot be optimal to use only the price in market A as signal. Using both prices as signals decreases the signalling costs, thus signalling costs are smaller for a multimarket incumbent.
Pooling Equilibria
We now analyze the pooling perfect bayesian equilibria. In a pooling PBE, …rst period prices of both types of incumbent are equal and thus do not signal the incumbent's type. Therefore, the entrant does not change his prior beliefs when he observes the equilibrium pair of prices.
As in subsection 3.1, we assume that E > f E > E . We further assume that o E + (1 o ) E < f E , which implies that under the prior beliefs the entrant's optimal decision is not to enter. This condition is necessary for a pooling PBE to exist. In fact, if this condition failed and the two types charged the same prices, the entrant would enter when he observes the pooling pair of prices. Given this, each type of incumbent would have an incentive to charge his monopoly prices in the …rst period, thus the pooling strategy could not be optimal.
In a pooling PBE, …rst period prices charged by the high and low cost incumbents are the same, (p A ; p B ) = (p A ; p B ) = (p A ; p B ). When (p A ; p B ) is observed, by Bayes'rule, the posterior beliefs are equal to the prior beliefs, i.e., (p A ; p B ) = o and the entrant's optimal decision is not to enter. We assume that for all other (p 0 A ; p 0 B ) the posterior beliefs are (p 0 A ; p 0 B ) = 0.
In any pooling PBE, (p A ; p B ) must be optimal for the high cost incumbent, i.e.:
This condition is the reverse of condition (4) used in the analysis of separating PBE. Let C 0 be the set of (p A ; p B ) that satisfy the incentive compatibility condition (8) . Set C 0 is given by all points inside the high cost isopro…t curve represented in Figure 1 .
Moreover, for a pooling PBE to exist, it must also be true that (p A ; p B ) is optimal for the low cost incumbent, i.e.:
This is precisely the same condition as (5) . Therefore, the set of points inside the low cost isopro…t curve represented in Figure 1 satisfy condition (9).
The following proposition summarizes the conditions for a pooling PBE.
Proposition 3
When o E + (1 o ) E < f E , a pooling PBE exists for some non-negative prices (p A ; p B ) set by the high and low cost incumbents if and only if the incentive compatibility conditions (8) and (9) both hold, i.e., (p A ; p B ) 2 C 0 \C.
Proof:
To show necessity is enough to notice that if either condition (8) or (9) fail, then either the high cost or the low cost incumbent is not behaving optimally in the proposed pooling PBE for any speci…cation of the o¤-the-equilibrium beliefs, thus one can not have a pooling PBE.
To show that conditions (8) and (9) are su¢ cient for a pooling PBE to exist it is important to notice that in a pooling PBE, by Bayes' rule, (p A ; p B ) = o . Assume that for all other
Given these beliefs and the assumptions over the entrant's pro…ts, it is optimal for the entrant not to enter when he observes (p A ; p B ) and to enter otherwise. But then, given the entrant's strategy, it is optimal for the high and low cost incumbents to set (p A ; p B ) if conditions (8) and (9) In this case it is easy to show that no pooling PBE survives the domination criterion. Since any pre-entry pair of prices (p A ; p B ) in (int C) \ C (in dark grey) is strictly dominated for a high cost incumbent but is not dominated for a low cost incumbent, then (p A ; p B ) = 1 for such pair of prices. Given these beliefs, the entrant will not enter if he observes any (p A ; p B ) in (int C) \ C.
But this implies that, in any pooling vector of prices, (p A ; p B ) 2 C 0 \C, the low cost incumbent would have an incentive to deviate to (p Am ; p Bm ). By doing so the low cost incumbent would increase his …rst period pro…t while at the same time he continues to deter entry. Since the low cost incumbent gains by deviating no pooling equilibrium survives the domination criterion.
In this case, the unique equilibrium that survives the domination criterion is the least cost separating equilibrium where the low cost incumbent charges his monopoly prices. Figure 5 illustrates an example where (p Am ; p Bm ) 2 C 0 \C. The set of (p A ; p B ) 2 C 0 \C, in grey, is the set of pooling PBE.
Reasonable pooling equilibria when (p
When (p Am ; p Bm ) 2 C 0 \C, some pooling equilibria are immune to the domination criterion. Let A;B be the level of pro…t where the low cost incumbent's isopro…t is tangent to the frontier of the incentive compatibility condition (8) . All the pooling PBE where pre-entry pro…ts of the low cost incumbent are lower than A;B (outside the area in squares) do not survive the domination criterion. Consider any such pooling PBE. Since the entrant will not enter if he observes any (p A ; p B ) in (int C) \ C since (p A ; p B ) = 1, the low cost incumbent would always have an incentive to deviate from the proposed pooling PBE to a pair of prices in (int C) \ C arbitrarily close to the tangency point (p A ; p B ). Therefore, the subset of pooling PBE in C 0 \C that are immune to the domination criterion is given by all (p A ; p B ) where pre-entry pro…ts of the low cost incumbent are higher than A;B . We denote this subset by I, I C 0 \C. Figure 5 depicts this subset in the area marked with squares. 
and
Notice that these conditions represent the set of prices where pre-entry pro…ts of the low cost incumbent are higher than his pooling PBE pre-entry pro…t and where pre-entry pro…ts of the high cost incumbent are lower than his pooling PBE pre-entry pro…t, respectively.
Using the intuitive criterion we eliminate most pooling PBE. Any pooling PBE above the isopro…t curve of the high cost incumbent with pro…t level A p Am + B p Bm fails the intuitive criterion, since (p Am ; p Bm ) is equilibrium dominated for the high cost incumbent and it is a pro…table deviation for the low cost incumbent. Moreover, any pooling PBE with (p A ; p B ) (p Am ; p Bm ) where the isopro…t curves of the two types intercept can not survive the intuitive criterion as one can …nd pairs of prices which are below the high cost isopro…t curve but above the low cost isopro…t curve. Figure 6 illustrates a pair of prices, (p A ;p B ), where the isopro…t curves (in grey) intercept. The area marked with hexagons corresponds to the pairs of prices which are equilibrium dominated for the high cost incumbent and where the low cost incumbent gains by deviating from (p A ;p B ). Thus (p A ;p B ) fails the intuitive criterion. However, the pooling equilibria where the two isopro…t curves are tangent survive the intuitive criterion. Since the low cost isopro…t curve is steeper than the high cost isopro…t curve, any (p A ;p B ) below the high cost isopro…t curve is necessarily below the low cost isopro…t curve, hence one can not …nd a (p A ;p B ) which is equilibrium dominated for the high cost incumbent but not for the low cost incumbent.
Under our demand assumptions, the set of pooling equilibria where the isopro…t curves are tangent and thus survive the intuitive criterion is the line-segment from (p A ; p B ) to (p Am ; p Bm ) (see Figure 7) . It is interesting to notice that the pooling equilibria also entail a downward distortion with equal distortions in both markets. 
Summary and further equilibrium re…nements
At this point it is useful to summarize the equilibria'results. Assuming Am Ad > Am Ad and E > f E > E , there always exists a unique separating PBE which is immune to the
there are no pooling equilibria. Therefore, there exists a unique reasonable PBE which is the least cost separating equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2.
On the other hand, if o E + (1 o ) E < f E we also have a set of pooling equilibria as long as the two types of incumbent are not too di¤erent (c is not too high). In this case, if (p Am ; p Bm ) is a dominated action for the high cost incumbent, none of the pooling equilibria survives the domination criterion and the unique reasonable PBE is the least cost separating equilibrium where each type charges the monopoly prices in the …rst period.
Finally, when o E + (1 o ) E < f E and the two types of incumbent are similar enough for (p Am ; p Bm ) to be supported as a pooling PBE, the set of pooling equilibria in the linesegment from (p A ; p B ) to (p Am ; p Bm ) in Figure 7 survive the intuitive criterion. In this case, we have multiple perfect bayesian equilibria which survive the intuitive criterion: the least cost separating equilibrium and the set of pooling equilibria in the line-segment from (p A ; p B ) to (p Am ; p Bm ). However, one can impose further re…nements upon o¤-the-equilibrium path beliefs using Grossman and Perry (1986) criterion. According to this criterion if there exists a set K of types who are better of choosing action a than the equilibrium strategy while the remaining types are worse of, given that the uninformed player revises his beliefs to believe that type 2 K and according to Bayes' rule, then the proposed equilibrium is overturned. The next result shows that there exists a unique PBE which survives the Grossman and Perry (1986) criterion.
Proposition 4 Suppose that Am
Ad > Am Ad and E > f E > E then there exists a unique PBE which survives the Grossman and Perry criterion which is equal to:
(i) the least cost separating equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2,
(ii) the least cost separating equilibrium where Proof: In case (i) and (ii) there exists a unique PBE which survives the domination criterion and consequently the intuitive criterion. Since Grossman and Perry criterion is a re…nement of the intuitive criterion, if it exists a PBE which survives the Grossman and Perry criterion, it is necessarily the least cost separating equilibrium. In each case, it is also easy to prove that the least cost separating equilibrium is immune to Grossman and Perry criterion.
In case (iii), the only PBE which is immune to Grossman and Perry criterion is the pooling PBE where both types choose …rst period prices (p Am ; p Bm ). Let us …rst eliminate the remaining pooling equilibria. Since Grossman and Perry criterion is a re…nement of the intuitive criterion, we just need to show that no other vector of prices in the line-segment from (p A ; p B ) to (p Am ; p Bm ) in Figure 7 It is interesting to notice that the unique PBE which survives the Grossman and Perry criterion is also the unique Pareto optimal equilibrium for the incumbent's types. Moreover, this unique PBE entails a downward distortion for at least one type, except in case (i) when ^ and in case (ii).
The previous result can be interpreted in terms of two factors: the prior probability of the incumbent having low marginal cost, 0 , and the di¤erence between the two types marginal cost, c. When the two types are very di¤erent the most reasonable result is the separating equilibrium where the low cost incumbent charges his monopoly prices. In this case, we get precisely the same solution than under complete information. It should be noted that the level of c necessary for costless separation depends on the remaining parameters.
When types are not very di¤erent, the most reasonable equilibrium depends on the prior beliefs. On the one hand, if 0 is low, the entrant will enter under prior beliefs. But then the most reasonable equilibrium is the least cost separating equilibrium, where the low cost incumbent distorts the pre-entry prices just enough to signal that he is not a high cost incumbent. One the other hand, if 0 is high, the entrant will not enter under the prior beliefs. In this case, the most reasonable equilibrium is the one where both types pool at the low cost monopoly prices.
The level of 0 above which the pooling equilibrium is the most reasonable one depends, among other factors, on the relative e¢ ciency of the entrant and on f E .
Although the entry deterrence literature has emphasized the least cost separating equilibrium, our results show that there are circumstances where the pooling equilibrium is the most reasonable equilibrium. In the next section, we argue that this is also the most problematic equilibrium in terms of antitrust intervention.
Policy implications
When the most reasonable equilibrium is the least cost separating one, there is no need for antitrust intervention. In this equilibrium, the second period market structure will always be the same than under complete information. Thus one cannot really speak of entry deterrence.
Moreover, under incomplete information the low cost incumbent may be forced to charge belowmonopoly prices in the …rst period in order to signal his type, which increases consumers surplus and welfare. Since overall welfare is either equal or higher under incomplete information, there is no need for policy intervention.
The most problematic case, from a policy point of view, occurs when the reasonable equilibrium is the one where both types pool at the low cost monopoly prices. In this case, the high cost incumbent successfully imitates his low cost counterpart, thereby preventing entry that would have occurred under complete information. The welfare implications are a priori ambiguous since ex-ante …rst period welfare is higher under incomplete information (since the high cost prices are distorted downwards) but ex-ante second period welfare may be lower (is lower if entry is socially desirable). If the regulator had complete information about the incumbent's cost it would be easy to identify the entry deterrence behavior. However if the regulator also has incomplete information about the incumbent's cost and auditing is very costly, the regulator will not be able to know if the incumbent is low cost (and is not having a predatory behavior) or if he is high cost (and is really deterring entry).
Our model has important implications for predatory pricing detection. If the incumbent operates in several markets and the regulator tests for predatory behavior are based exclusively on the price practiced in the regulated market, the incumbent may just distort prices in the other markets, to avoid being caught by the regulation authorities. This implies that regulation authorities need to look at the prices practiced in all the markets where the incumbent operates.
However it should be noted that this only helps the regulator in detecting entry deterrence behavior when the regulator knows, or can learn, the incumbents costs.
One interesting application of our model is when the incumbent operates in a domestic and in a foreign market. Let us assume that the captive market is the domestic market whereas entry may occur in the foreign market. Under our assumptions, the foreign market is larger than the domestic market, k < 1. Thus equilibrium prices will always be higher in the foreign market. However, if the two types of incumbent are not too di¤erent, in the most reasonable equilibrium prices may be distorted downwards so as to deter entry. This implies that having lower prices in the foreign market is not a necessary condition for predatory pricing to exist (we may have predatory pricing by the incumbent even when he is charging higher prices in the foreign market). This is interesting because, traditionally, the suspicion of predatory behavior is only considered when the price practiced in the foreign market is lower than in the domestic market.
On the other hand, when k > 1, the domestic market is larger and less elastic than the foreign market, thus the equilibrium prices are lower in the foreign market. However, a lower price in the foreign market per se is not a su¢ cient condition for entry deterrence behavior to be present. When k > 1, optimal third-degree price discrimination leads to lower prices in the foreign market even when the incumbent is not behaving in a predatory manner. Entry deterrence behavior is present only when the prices are distorted downwards relatively to the complete information discriminatory prices.
One case where there is clear evidence of entry deterrence behavior is when the price (in the foreign or/and in the domestic market) is below marginal cost. However, it should be noted that when both prices can be used as signals, pricing below marginal cost is much less likely since the distortion in each market is smaller than when signalling is done only in the competitive market.
Conclusion
This paper extends previous analysis of entry deterrence to a setup which considers thirddegree price discrimination and product di¤erentiation. Considering potential entry in one of the two independent markets where the incumbent operates, the incumbent uses third-degree price discrimination to deter entry when the entrant has incomplete knowledge about the incumbent's production cost. The entrant o¤ers a di¤erentiated product and decides whether to enter after observing incumbent's pre-entry prices in both markets. Thus, the incumbent may have an incentive to distort both pre-entry prices in order to convey information on production cost to the entrant so as to deter entry.
In the presence of this signaling e¤ect we show that incumbent's complete information prices may no longer hold. We show that there is always a unique reasonable perfect bayesian equilibrium. There are some cases where the most reasonable equilibrium is the least cost separating one. In this equilibrium, the low cost incumbent's pre-entry prices may have a downward distortion with respect to the complete information setting. The low cost incumbent uses pre-entry prices in both markets to signal low production cost. Moreover, we show that this distortion is the same in both markets. The price distortion is increasing with the discount factor, the degree of product substitutability and the e¢ ciency of the entrant.
For the remaining cases, we show that the unique equilibrium that survives the Grossman and Perry (1986) criterion is the pooling equilibrium where both types of incumbents set the low cost incumbent monopoly prices. In this equilibrium, the high cost incumbent successfully imitates his low cost counterpart, thereby preventing entry that would have occurred under complete information. Although this is the most problematic case from an antitrust perspective, previous literature on entry deterrence has not given much emphasis to the pooling equilibrium, in part because it failed to identify the most reasonable equilibrium.
An implication of our analysis to predatory pricing detection is that policy regulation authorities should reach worldwide information since …rms are becoming global and may price lower than the monopoly prices in more than one market in order to deter entry. This paper shows that in some cases multinational …rms may not be using purely discriminatory pricing but discriminatory limit pricing.
One interesting application of our model is when the incumbent operates in a domestic and in a foreign market. In this context, our results show that a lower price in the foreign market is neither a necessary nor a su¢ cient condition for the existence of entry deterrence behavior in the foreign market. It is not su¢ cient because a lower price in the foreign market may be just a consequence of optimal third-degree price discrimination. It is not necessary because we may have an higher price in the foreign market while, at the same time, prices in both domestic and foreign market are distorted downwards with respect to the complete information prices and thus the incumbent is deterring entry.
Further work should include the presence of an active regulator, for instance, in only one of the incumbent's operating markets. This may lead to the use of signaling exclusively in the unregulated market. Three other extensions seem worth considering. The analysis of other incumbent's strategies, such as accommodation strategies, which may lead to an upward distortion in prices. It would also be interesting to relax the assumption of constant marginal production cost. Finally, oligopolist incumbent …rms would also be a relevant framework to consider since two-sided signaling arises.
the incentive compatibility condition of the high cost incumbent given by condition (4), i.e.: This means that (p 0 A ; p 0 B ) is in the interior of C and then C \ C is non-empty. Therefore, condition (6) is a su¢ cient condition for the existence of a separating PBE. 
C Single-crossing condition analysis

